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Abstract Pairwise comparison is a popular assessment method either for deriving
criteria-weights or for evaluating alternatives according to a given criterion. In real-
world applications consistency of the comparisons rarely happens: intransitivity can
occur. The aim of the paper is to discuss the relationship between the consistency of
the decision maker—described with the error-free property—and the consistency of
the pairwise comparison matrix (PCM). The concept of error-free matrix is used to
demonstrate that consistency of the PCM is not a sufficient condition of the error-free
property of the decision maker. Informed and uninformed decision makers are defined.
In the first stage of an assessment method a consistent or near-consistent matrix should
be achieved: detecting, measuring and improving consistency are part of any proce-
dure with both types of decision makers. In the second stage additional information
are needed to reveal the decision maker’s real preferences. Interactive questioning
procedures are recommended to reach that goal.
Keywords Decision making · Pairwise comparisons · Consistency · Error-free
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1 Introduction
Deriving priorities, weights of criteria, or eliciting preference intensities (scores) of
the alternatives according to a given criterion based on the preferences of the decision
maker (DM) can be done with various methodological tools. Following the works of
Saaty the pairwise comparison approach has been proved as one of the most popular
methods in the field of multi-attribute decision making. Having a decision problem
with n alternatives and k criteria most of the solution methods use a pay-off matrix
and weights for the criteria. In a real world problem it could be difficult to obtain the
elements of the pay-off matrix and the values of the weight vector. The AHP method
(Saaty 1980) uses pairwise comparison to elicit data, and the hierarchical problem is
solved by applying the eigenvector method. Several authors analyzed the AHP, focus-
ing on different elements of the method. It is not the aim of this paper to deal with
them, however, AHP and its philosophy serve as references for certain points in our
discussion.
If the pairwise comparison matrix (PCM) is given, a great variety of methods have
been recommended to estimate the preferences of the DM. Choo and Wedley (2004)
and Lin (2007) collected a great number of estimation methods from previous works
and they found that the efficiency of the estimation depends on the characteristics
of the PCM. If the matrix has “good” properties, e.g. it is a near-consistent matrix,
then the estimations from very different type of methods are very close to each other,
and the most simple estimation methods can be applied. In that sense the consistency
of the PCM is important.
Producing a PCM via the judgments of the DM is a controversial procedure. As
most of the researchers agree, if the number of elements to be compared in a pairwise
manner is high (>6 or 7), the DM is uncertain in her answers and the PCM fails to meet
certain requirements, e.g. expressing the real preferences of the DM. We can say that
the DM is not able to give us her values consequently. In that sense the consistency of
the decision maker is important.
The aim of this paper is to distinguish the consistency of the PCM and the consis-
tency of the decision maker. Using the same word—consistency—in both cases can
be controversial. This is why I will reserve the term “consistency” for the PCM, and
the decision maker will be labeled with another term: this is the error-free property.
It is essential that I will treat the problem from a decision-aiding approach (Tsoukias
2008). The decision maker and the decision problem are in the front of the discussion.
2 Pairwise comparisons and decision making
Suppose, that we want to evaluate n alternatives according to a given criterion. The
method is to compare pairs of alternatives, and the values v1, v2, …, vn (preference
intensities, scores) are estimated from the n × n PCM. The problem is the same if we
want to determine criteria weights: in that case we have to obtain pairwise comparison
values for pairs of criteria. It is common in both cases that the preference intensities or
weights are derived from data measured on ratio scale (Fichtner 1986; Wedley 2008).
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We can say that alternative Ai is preferred to alternative A j according to the ratio
vi /v j .
Definition 1 Decision makers can be classified as “informed” and “uninformed”. The
informed DM knows v1, v2, …, vn explicitly. The uninformed DM may not knowv1,
v2, …,vn sufficiently, or v1, v2, …, vn may not even exist and need to be developed
by aiding the DM appropriately.
The DM (in a procedure we do not define at the moment) will give pairwise com-
parisons ti j to be considered as the approximation of the ratios vi /v j (for all i , j = 1,
2, …, n, i = j). The PCM T = [ti j ] is positive reciprocal (ti j > 0 for all i , j t j i = 1/ti j
if i = j), and the diagonal elements are equal to 1. We have to note that the reciprocal
property assumes a consequent behavior of the DM. That assumption makes possible
the reduction of the number of pairwise comparisons to a half: we have to ask only for
one comparison having two pairs of alternatives with the same elements in different
order.
In the rest of the paper further definitions and propositions will follow. Some of
the propositions do not need a formal proof, they are consequences of the defini-
tions (see e.g. Proposition 1). Other propositions can describe conjectures (see e.g.
Proposition 6).
Definition 2 Matrix T is error-free if ti j = vi /v j (for all i , j = 1, 2, …, n, i = j), as
defined by Choo and Wedley (2004).
In that case the elements of matrix T reflect the real preferences of the DM.
Definition 3 Matrix T is consistent if ti j · t jk = tik , for all i , j , k = 1, 2, …, n. The
rank of a consistent matrix T is 1.
This is the well-known transitivity property for the triads of alternatives.
Proposition 1 If T is error-free, then T is consistent.
Proposition 1 is a straight consequence of Definitions 2 and 3.
The preference intensities will be derived from T with the help of the  estimation
function (Choo and Wedley 2004). The properties of the estimation methods have
been thoroughly analyzed (see e.g.Cogger and Yu 1985; Golany and Kress 1993). Let
the result of the estimation be w.
Proposition 2 If T is error-free, then w = v.
The proposition is a consequence of the interpretation of v.
In case of an error-free T, estimating the values of w can be done with several
equivalent methods. In this case the properties of the chosen method will not influ-
ence the result, so it is worth to choose the most simple method (e.g. estimation from
the columns of T).
3 Error-free property of the decision maker and the consistency of the pairwise
comparison matrix
Definition 4 If the elements of T are given on ratio scale, the decision maker is error-
free if
123
242 J. Temesi
1. the PCM is a positive, reciprocal, consistent matrix,
2. the pairwise comparisons reflect precisely to the decision maker’s real preferences.
Proposition 3 The decision maker is error-free if and only if T is error-free.
The usual inconsistency measures (see later) are based on the consistency of the
PCM. They do not say anything about the error-free property of the decision maker.
It should be emphasized that the DM is the only person, who may know and who
can give information about the real values of v1, v2, …, vn . An inconsistent T matrix
can signal the error caused by an informed DM, but it can often happen, too, that
the DM (informed or uninformed) is unable to give an error-free matrix via pairwise
comparisons. We can define different inconsistency measures for T, and correction
methods can be built to reach a consistent or a near-consistent matrix. The importance
of distinguishing the two types of the DMs is that the decision aiding procedure has
to reflect to it.
Saaty and others put the emphasis on the fact that to find decision makers, who
will give a consistent T, is practically impossible. In real world decision situations the
matrix T of a decision maker will contain intransitivity.
Proposition 4 DM likely produces inconsistent T.
What are the sources of inconsistency? Decision scientists stress that—especially
with a great number of alternatives—the DM could not see the consequences of so
many pairwise comparisons: psychological, cognitive limitations are the obstacles.
Even in case of an informed DM, revealing preferences can cause errors in the pair-
wise questioning procedure. It is rarely emphasized that the source of inconsistency
can be the questioning procedure itself, or in special cases the applied scaling leads to
a built-in inconsistency (e.g. any scaling system with fixed endpoints). Assuming an
uninformed DM, revealing uncertain preferences would cause the inconsistency, too.
Most of the practitioners do not analyze the reasons leading to inconsistent matrix T.
The consequence is that a consistent or a near-consistent PCM is accepted for the esti-
mation of v even in case of an uninformed DM, without further analysis. This approach
can result in values vi far from the real ones.
Proposition 5 It is possible to have consistent T that is not error-free.
Remark Choo and Wedley (2004) discuss this proposition in an other context.
In case of an uninformed DM, consistency of PCM is not sufficient for reaching the
error-free property: the (2) condition of the error-free DM should be met, too.
It is possible, for instance, that we have more than one consistent matrix to the same
problem: only one of them can be error-free.
Example 1 Suppose that we obtained the following matrix from the decision maker:
T =
⎡
⎣
1 2 5
1 3
1
⎤
⎦
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Looking at the matrix we can see that it is not transitive (not consistent). Suppose that
we want to give the possibility to the DM to correct the matrix with modifying one
element only. Our recommendation for the DM is to choose one of the matrices as
follows:
T1 =
⎡
⎣
1 2 6
1 3
1
⎤
⎦ T2 =
⎡
⎣
1 2 5
1 5/2
1
⎤
⎦ T3 =
⎡
⎣
1 5/3 5
1 3
1
⎤
⎦
If the error-free matrix is one of the T1, T2, T3 matrices, then without having addi-
tional information from the DM we are not able to tell which one is the “correct”
matrix T (as v is not known).
We can say that in this particular case we do not need a correction. In the first
step we can accept the original T as a good approximation of a consistent matrix, and
we can get the w values from a proper  estimation function. In the second step the
DM will check the w vector, and if she accepts it, then the procedure is over. This
argumentation assumes an inconsistency measure (indicator, index), and a threshold
value to decide whether T is accepted or not.
However, even if we can measure the inconsistency, and we have a threshold value,
we can construct an example, where the original T cannot be accepted, even though
our choice problem of T is relevant.
In Example 1 we could not solve a correction problem, because the connection
between the consistency of the T matrix and the error-free property of the DM, as it
is declared in Proposition 5, does not allow us to follow the logic of choosing any
consistent matrix.
Consistency of the T matrix is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to get an
error-free matrix T. However, if we want to have a close to error-free matrix we have to
know “how far” we are from a consistent matrix (simply because the error-free matrix
is consistent). Therefore, we have to face with the problem of the measurability of
inconsistency of PCMs.
Definition 5 Matrix T is near-consistent if the value of a given inconsistency measure
(indicator) is lower than a threshold value.
Before taking a glance at detecting, measuring and improving consistency of the T
matrix, I want to clarify the significance of the hypothesis that in most cases v is not
known explicitly.
Proposition 6 Decision makers in real-life decision situations are uninformed.
Two examples are provided. There are famous cases in the literature that have been
constructed in the light of a known vector v. I will demonstrate that their interpretations
can be misleading. The illustrative cases are mutations of certain Saaty examples: to
draw the consequences the exact copies of the examples are not necessary.
Example 2 Suppose that the task is to compare the volumes of different fruits. Esti-
mating the volumes is not easy because of the shape of the fruits, but it is possible to
measure them with a slight error. The measurement says that the ratios of the volume
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of three fruits are 1:4:8. A perfectly informed decision maker can give a consistent
matrix with those ratios:
TF =
⎡
⎣
1 4 8
1 2
1
⎤
⎦
Three persons were requested to make the comparisons, and we got the following
matrices:
TF1 =
⎡
⎣
1 4 7
1 3
1
⎤
⎦ TF2 =
⎡
⎣
1 2 9
1 3
1
⎤
⎦ TF3 =
⎡
⎣
1 2 6
1 3
1
⎤
⎦
Without knowing the measured volumes and supported only with the inconsistency
measures of the matrices we may conclude that TF3 is acceptable, and the third per-
son is an error-free DM, because she has a consistent matrix. Unfortunately, the real
volumes can show us, that none of the DMs was error-free, and from that very rationale
viewpoint none of them gave the real ratios. We can even convince them, of course,
about their “wrong” judgments allowing them to see the measured values.
Our question is: given the three matrices from three uninformed DMs (no oppor-
tunity to measure the volumes), do we need any correction for any of the matrices? If
yes, what would be the basis of the correction?
Example 3 For the sake of simplicity, let suppose that after asking three persons about
the wealth of three nations with the method of pairwise comparisons, we have got the
same matrices, as in Example 2. Let the ratios of GDP be 1:4:8, having the same TF
as before. What can we say about the consistency of the “decision makers”?
The wealth of nations is not objectively measurable, it is influenced by several
factors, GDP is a usual proxy measure. The first and the second person would realize,
that they did not give transitive answers compared to the known GDP values, however,
they could insist that the wF1 and wF2 values obtained from their matrices TF1 and
TF2, and different from the vF values estimated from the matrix TF, can describe their
preferences properly!
It is possible that we will accept (after some adjustment) all three matrices: all of
the decision makers with different T matrices are error-free! We have three differ-
ent v vectors, each of them differs from the vF vector, but they are in total harmony
with their preferences, and reflect precisely the subjective evaluations of the decision
makers about the wealth of nations.
In real group decision making situations with subjective preferences it can often
happen, that we ask for pairwise comparisons of the same alternatives according to a
given criterion, and in that case we might face the result what we have got in Example 3.
Saaty uses these examples (Saaty 1980, 2005) to demonstrate the validity of the pair-
wise comparison method for rationale decision makers: they are able to give “good”
estimations. The resolution of the controversy is that Saaty solves a different problem:
approximation of a known v vector with pairwise comparisons. Knowing the correct
values we can evaluate the DM (her “consistency”), too. In real cases, where v is
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unknown, we do not have reference vectors, and the DM reveals her hidden prefer-
ences via pairwise comparisons. Who can judge the result? Only the decision maker
herself. In a decision aiding process the consultant can see the consistency or incon-
sistency of the PCM, and he can call the attention of the decision maker to that kind
of inconsistency; but he is not able to show the right direction of any improvement,
simply because he has no idea about it.
Proposition 7 In case of unknown v, improving the consistency of an inconsistent
matrix is possible only with additional information from the decision maker.
4 Detecting, measuring and improving consistency
In real-world decision processes, where PCM approaches are used, the following steps
can be applied:
Step 1: Determining the elements of the pairwise-comparison matrix
Step 2: Consistency analysis
Step 3: Correction of the PCM
Step 4: Applying an estimation method
Step 5: Verification
This 5-step procedure was analyzed in Temesi (2006) focusing on the consistency
problem. What are the general reasons leading us to detect and to measure inconsis-
tency in Step 2?
– It could be crucial to check the aptitude of the DM (e.g. in group decision making),
when excluding him/her from the decision process is possible: PCMs very far from
being consistent can signal the ineligibility of the DM.
– The analysis of the given problem could be resulted in claiming that pairwise
comparison as a modeling tool could not be applied.
– The most common reason is that inconsistency measure is supposed to measure
the degree of intransitivity, and with the modification of matrix T we want to help
the decision maker to be more consequent.
Most of the authors respect Saaty’s consistency index and consistency ratio as ref-
erences when they create their own indicators. Saaty uses the difference (λmax − n)
to define a consistency ratio. His consistency ratio compares (λmax − n)/(n − 1)−
the consistency index, CI-, with an index, RI, calculated from the same values from
randomly generated reciprocal matrices. Saaty says that if CI/RI > 0.1, the DM should
revise her judgments on preferences.
The advantages of the Saaty ratio within the logic of his method are obvious.
However, critiques say that the 10%-rule is an arbitrary rule of thumb, near-consistent
pairwise comparison matrices not having accepted by the 10%-rule can be constructed,
and some intuitively “far from consistent” matrices might be accepted. We can add that
in the applications the consistency of the T matrix is regarded here as the consistency
of the DM.
While constructing new consistency measures (indices) the researchers more or
less accepted a few properties for those measures:
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– in case of a consistent matrix the value of the index should be 0,
– upper and lower bounds are needed (the lower bound in general is 0),
– the values of the index between the lower and upper bound should have an interpre-
tation from a consistency viewpoint, or at least a threshold value could be verified,
– if the scale is limited in a questioning procedure, the upper bound of the consistency
index could be given using the lower and upper values of the scale.
There are several approaches to measuring consistency. The harmonic consistency
index (Stein and Mizzi 2007) is based on the additive normalization method. Aguarón
and Moreno-Jiménez (2003) created the geometric consistency index using the esti-
mator of the variance of the perturbations of Crawford and Williams (1985) from the
row geometric mean method. Koczkodaj (1993) used the concept of triads for mea-
suring consistency. Bozóki and Rapcsák (2008) developed the idea further and they
proved a relationship between the Saaty ratio and the Koczkodaj index. This short
list of the approaches suggests that a generally accepted method for measuring the
inconsistency of a PCM does not exist. Saaty’s inconsistency index dominates the
applications, however, its interpretation is fragile, especially regarding the threshold
value.
In order to get an error-free matrix not only the properties of the original PCM is
crucial, but the accuracy and the efficiency of the estimation function, too. The esti-
mation function  is efficient, if (T) is “close enough” to the real preference vector.
The concept of efficiency is different from the accuracy of the estimation. Choo and
Wedley (2004) and Lin (2007) have investigated 18 estimation methods for the pair-
wise comparison problem. 12 of the methods were distance minimizing method, using
the distance of wi /w j from ti j (e.g. least square, least absolute error, logarithmic least
square). In case of error-free matrices they analyzed six methods (e.g. simple nor-
malized column sum, right eigenvector, preference weighted geometric mean). The
conclusion is that neither the accuracy of the estimation (fitness), nor the consistency
ratio of a PCM will measure the error-free property of the decision maker, because
those indicators can express only one dimension of that property.
In the light of our discussion the straightforward application of the 5-step procedure
and the role of certain steps should be analyzed further. Determining the elements of
the PCM and verification of the results are the most critical steps. Consistency is a
necessary condition, and it should be checked, however, the significance of the con-
sistency analysis and its application together with a consistency improvement method
are different, depending on the type of the decision maker.
5 Correcting the elements of PCM for the informed and uninformed DM
Suppose that in Step 2 we chose a method to measure the consistency of matrix T. If
matrix T is consistent or near-consistent we would go to Step 4, and we have to check
the error-free property in Step 5.
If matrix T is not consistent, then consistency improvement is needed in Step 3.
The improvement method will correct some (or all) elements in matrix T in order to
obtain a new matrix with better consistency. Applying a correction method it is crucial
to know what kind of error has been occurred during the elicitation method (Step 1):
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Type 1: The errors, fluctuations in the judgments of the DM were around the
“correct” values within a small distance; there is a kind of “noise” in the
system.
Type 2: Systematic errors, under- or over-estimations of certain comparisons
occurred.
Type 3: Outliers could be detected, e.g. as a consequence of communication errors
or misunderstandings.
According to the type of the error various improvement techniques can be developed:
• improvement can be done with a perturbation method (in case of noise),
• improving the consistency of a sequence of triads (in case of under- or over-esti-
mation),
• adjustment starting from the greatest violence of consistency (in case of outliers).
In case of errors with Type 1 the assumption is that all elements can be biased, and an
increase in consistency can be achieved by the modification of (almost) all elements of
matrix T. The method of Xu and Wei (1999) developed for the AHP is a good example
of that approach.
If certain comparisons contain judgment errors—Type 2—then systematic analysis
of the triads of matrix T and replacing some elements with their corrected values can
lead to better or perfect consistency. Bozóki et al. (2010) use integer programming to
detect the number of triads and to locate inconsistency. Their method does not even
need an inconsistency measure: after determining the minimum number of elements
to be modified to meet the perfect consistency a procedure is given to execute the
modifications.
The most common approach is to locate the greatest violence of consistency in a
matrix T. Modifying the proper element in a good direction the consistency of matrix T
will be better. The AHP applications follow that approach (Saaty 2005), but approaches
with totally different philosophy, for instance the singular value decomposition method
(Gass and Rapcsák 2004) can determine corrections on the same way.
Having an inconsistent T and an informed DM, the correction method can help
eliciting an error-free matrix, because the informed DM has a quite good knowledge
of preference intensities of v j . Having an inconsistent T and an uninformed DM the
error-free property is not guaranteed by the consistency or near-consistency of T hav-
ing been reached by the correction method; it must be incorporated into the decision
aiding process.
The correction methods differ in requiring the presence of the decision maker. There
are approaches that do not need the DM in the improvement procedure. The absence
of the DM can be explained by various reasons:
• The DM is busy and she has no time or she is not available for an other questioning.
• The task is an ex post analysis of a decision has been made earlier, the decision
makers are not available.
• The PCM was built from empirical facts without meeting the DM personally.
Proposition 8 Applying automatic correction methods (i.e. no information is given
by the DM) in Step 3 is possible, but in that case the presence of the DM is required
in Step 5.
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The best way to obtain error-free PCM is to ensure the permanent presence of
the DM in the entire decision making procedure. Eliciting the elements of T and
improving the consistency in an interactive process can lead to one of the following
results:
– an error-free matrix T is accepted,
– it is impossible to get an error-free matrix for the given problem.
Proposition 9 Interactive methods for generating matrix T are invariant to the type
of the DM.
The consequence of Proposition 9 is that using interactive procedures Step 1 (and
Step 3, if it is applied) can replace Step 5. Proposition 9 suggests that in real-world
applications we can avoid the verification problem applying interactive methods. How-
ever, in other cases explicit use of a verification method is needed to get an error-free
matrix.
Proposition 10 If the decision maker is not present in the correction method, the
resulted T (and w) should be verified in Step 5.
A possible verification is to prove that the given problem belongs to the class of
Type 1, 2 or 3, and the applied automatic correction method is relevant to that type.
In certain cases (when the elicitation of the elements of the PCM leads to a consis-
tent T) the whole process is reduced to two stages: generating PCM and the estimation
of w. The proposed approach is to obtain a consistent or near-consistent PCM with a
proper interactive questioning procedure before estimating the w vector.
The questioning procedure would meet the following conditions:
a) the DM must participate in the entire procedure (availability),
b) the DM reveals preferences without any influence (neutrality),
c) the DM is supported to discover and to reveal her real preferences (decision-
aiding).
Based on (a–c) several procedures can be built to reach the matrix T at the end of
the first stage. A few options are listed here differing in their strategy:
A) Multiple random questioning: the DM is requested to repeat the elicitation pro-
cedure from different initial pairs of alternatives on different pathways (Temesi
2006).
B) Reducing the number of questions with ensuring transitivity in each step.
C) Combining different elicitation techniques (Srdjevic 2005).
D) Combining the elicitation with mathematical programming (goal-programming)
models (Shirland et al. 2003).
Having a consistent or a near-consistent matrix, the choice of  is not crucial after
the first stage, the properties of the estimation methods become important only in
case of a PCM far from a consistent matrix. One of the most significant problems is
rank reversal, which is discussed in the literature exhaustively. A more strict condi-
tion, the preservation of order of intensity of preference is described by Bana e Costa
and Vansnick (2008): if there is a ranking relation between ti j and tkl , then the wi /w j ,
wk /wl ratios should also satisfy that relation. Most of the common estimation methods
do not meet that very restrictive criterion.
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6 Conclusion
In multiattribute decision making problems using pairwise comparison matrices it is
crucial to distinguish the type of the decision maker. Obtaining an error-free PCM
will require different approaches if we have informed or uninformed decision maker.
Most of consistency and verification problems can be avoided with the application
of interactive procedures ensuring the presence of the decision maker in each step.
These procedures can contain various combinations of simple questioning, consistency
checking and estimation methods.
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